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Representing Evil in Schindler’s List and Life is Beautiful 
 
Simon Oliver 
University of Nottingham 
 
To argue for silence, prayer, the banishment equally of poetry and knowledge, in short, the 
witness of ‘ineffability’, that is, non-representability, is to mystify something we dare not 
understand, because we fear that it may be all too understandable, all too continuous with 
what we are – human, all too human. 
- Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law 
  
The cinematic representation of the Shoah or Holocaust is prolific, running to several 
hundred films and documentaries.1 Of course, depictions of such horrors raise a number of 
crucial philosophical and ethical questions. Can the Shoah be represented? In what ways do 
filmic representations of the Shoah contribute to the writing of history? How is the 
necessarily privileged position of the camera to be negotiated? Should there be limits to 
such depictions? Is it right to portray the heroic exploits of certain individuals or 
remarkable stories of survival when so many millions died as anonymized victims of 
industrialised genocide? 
 
For some film-makers, the question of representation is best answered by returning to key 
locations, the authority of survivors and the testimony of victims and perpetrators. Film 
becomes a vehicle for the transmission of historical witness; the medium is rendered as 
transparent as possible. The most prominent example of such an approach can be found in 
Claude Lanzmann’s nine-and-a-half hour epic Shoah (1985).2 The impetus towards making 
films based on survivors’ memoirs using painstaking historical detail has been very strong 
for a number of reasons. First, the number of witnesses is diminishing as the years pass and 
memories become cold amongst succeeding generations. Our connection to the events of the 
mid-twentieth century moves from shared memory towards history as an object of study. 
Film can be a means to preserve the sources. Secondly, the abhorrent spectre of Holocaust 
denial has ensured that filmmakers pay particular attention to the historical record in its 
                                           
1 For a comprehensive and critical survey of the Holocaust in film, see Annette Insdorf, Indelible Shadows: Film 
and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2003). 
2 For an exacting critical appraisal of Shoah and Schindler’s List with further fascinating references to James 
Ivory’s Remains of the Day (1993), see Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), ch.2, especially p.49. 
various forms. Deviation from, or even lack of attention to, that record is quickly labelled 
‘revisionist’. Thirdly, many critics, following the lead of Theodor Adorno who famously 
claimed that ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’, 3  insist that the artistic 
representation of the Shoah is not possible and only survivors’ first-hand testimonies and 
documentary footage should be preserved and disseminated. 
 
Lanzmann’s work is sometimes regarded as the culmination of post-traumatic, historical 
depictions of the Shoah. In its mammoth assemblage of the accounts of witnesses alongside 
visits to the sites of Nazi murder and genocide, Shoah seemed to constitute the final and 
authoritative historical rendition of the horror of the concentration camps. Alongside, for 
example, Alain Resnais’s Night and Fog (1955) and Michel Drach’s Les Violons du Bal (1974), 
these films attempt to disrupt the present with the particular and personal memories of 
tragedy and terror which belong to an inevitably fading past. Nevertheless, many other 
cinematic approaches have been developed and different perspectives on the Shoah have 
been explored, including those of perpetrators, victims and children. The adaptation of 
historical novels is a particularly prominent genre. While based on memoirs and first-hand 
accounts, placing an historical novel on the screen allows the film-maker greater licence to 
interpret the events and weave together historical and fictional characters in the creation of 
compelling narratives which are nevertheless in some sense rooted in an historical source. 
One of the most successful recent examples of this approach is Roman Polanski’s The 
Pianist (2002) based on the memoirs of the Polish pianist Wladyslaw Szpilman and his 
survival in Warsaw during the Nazi occupation. 
 
In this essay, I intend to assess theologically two very different examples of film’s approach 
to the Shoah, the first of which is an adaptation of an historical novel. Measured in terms of 
box office receipts and awards, Stephen Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993) is not only the 
most successful film to date about the Shoah, it is also one of the most successful films ever 
made. It is based on Thomas Keneally’s historical novel Schindler’s Ark, the story of the 
German business man Oskar Schindler and his rescue of over one thousand mainly Polish 
Jews during the Second World War. Coupled with his ‘Film and Video Archive of the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Museum’ (now including 1,005 hours of archival footage relating to 
the Shoah), Spielberg has had an enormous impact on debates concerning the representation 
of the Jewish experience in the mid-twentieth century. Despite receiving criticism for 
                                           
3 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’ in Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical 
Reader, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.162. 
rendering mass extermination ‘consumable’ according to the priorities of Hollywood, 
Schindler’s List has been the focus of considerable critical acclaim. Its commercial success 
suggests that it is by far the most influential film about the Shoah ever made. 
 
The second focus of this essay is Roberto Benigni’s Life is Beautiful/ La vita è bella (1997). 
This film has also enjoyed considerable world-wide success: Benigni won the Oscar for Best 
Actor and the film won two other Academy Awards. The film also won the award for the 
Best Jewish Experience at the Jerusalem International Film Festival and the Grand Prix at 
the Cannes Film Festival. Nevertheless, it has proved very controversial because of the use 
of Chaplinesque comedy in its approach to an horrific period in European history. Gerald 
Peary, writing in the Boston Phoenix in November 1998, states, ‘Life Is Beautiful isn’t just 
the film title, it’s Benigni’s reprehensible moral. He dares to assign a transcendent meaning 
to the Holocaust, which to most Jews resonates with non-meaning, a hollow waste of many 
millions of lives.’ 4  Writing in the same month in Time, Richard Schickel writes, 
‘Sentimentality is a kind of fascism too, robbing us of judgment and moral acuity, and it 
needs to be resisted. Life Is Beautiful is a good place to start.’5 
 
I am returning to these familiar, much-discussed and commercially successful films in order 
to assess them in relation to a particular theological perspective on the nature of theological 
language and the ontological status of evil. They offer fundamentally different approaches 
to the questions of representation which continually surround Holocaust film. I will argue 
that the delicate use of allegory and comedy in Life is Beautiful at once resists establishing 
the Shoah as unrepresentable and therefore definitive of history’s meaninglessness while 
also maintaining the devastating incoherence, and therefore ‘unspeakable’, nature of 
genocide. Contrary to Peary’s assessment, it is precisely Bengini’s refusal to assign any 
transcendent meaning to the Shoah which renders Life is Beautiful an insightful approach to 
the subject. By contrast, the cinematic spectacle of Schindler’s List, while doubtless 
heightening public awareness of the terrors of the Shoah and helping to assuage what 
Gillian Rose calls ‘knowledge-resistance to the Holocaust’, nevertheless renders the 
experience of Jews and Germans in mid-twentieth century Europe  too accessible on a 
pietistic and literal plain, and therefore ‘comprehensible’. I begin, however, with the 
theological background against which I will read these films. 
 
                                           
4 http://geraldpeary.com/reviews/jkl/life-is-beautiful.html, accessed 24th May, 2011. 
5 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,989504,00.html, accessed 24th May, 2011. 
Privative Evil 
Both the ancient Jewish and Christian traditions, influenced by the legacy of Platonic 
philosophy, insisted on the supreme reality, and therefore intelligibility, of the Good. 
According to Plato’s famous allegory of the sun in the Republic, just as the light of the sun 
makes all things visible and therefore knowable, so too the ‘light’ of the Good preserves all 
things and renders them intelligible.6 By an intensifying participation in the Good, visible 
created things are more fully themselves. I know the desk at which I am sat is a desk and 
not a chair or a pile of firewood precisely because it is a good desk. When we speak of 
someone as a true friend, we mean also that this person is a good friend. So the good and the 
true are intimately intertwined in Plato’s metaphysics. Knowledge of things (epistemology) 
cannot be separated from what things are (ontology). The Good is that which, in itself, is 
most supremely intelligible. All other things are intelligible insofar as they participate in the 
Good. This is to say that, the more fully something is fulfilled or actualised, the more 
intelligible it becomes. 
 
The Jewish and Christian doctrine of creation diverged from the ancient Greek 
philosophical tradition in insisting that God creates ex nihilo. Nevertheless, the Platonic 
character of theological approaches to creation was maintained in other crucial respects. For 
example, just as for Plato the Good is the only source of intelligible light and being, so for 
later theologians there is only one source of being, namely the divine. Created being is a 
participation in being-itself and has no self-standing ontological status outside of this 
participative relationship. The insistence on God as the ex nihilo source of all things who at 
once enfolds the transcendentals of the Good, the True and the Beautiful has consequences 
for the theological understanding of evil. For the Neoplatonists, Jewish thinkers such as 
Philo of Alexandria, and the theologians of the early Church, evil is a privation of the good. 
Contrary to Gnostic and Manichean cosmologies, the tradition of evil as privatio boni 
maintains that evil has no ‘foothold in being’: it is a privation which is wholly parasitic on 
the Good.7 Some contemporary criticisms of the privatio boni tradition point out the viewing 
evil merely as a privation cannot do justice to its horror and force, not least in the 
experience of the Shoah. However, it should be remembered that the tradition of viewing 
evil as a privation of the Good is not an empirical thesis about how we experience evil, but a 
                                           
6 Plato, Republic, 507b-508d. 
7 For a contemporary analysis and defence of the privatio boni tradition against the Kantian radical evil school 
represented by, for example, Jean-François Lyotard, see John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon 
(London: Routledge, 2003), ch.1. 
metaphysical thesis about evil’s ontological status in relation to a transcendent reality. It is 
an aspect of the doctrine of creation. 
 
For Jewish and Christian theologians, the transcendence of God, the source of all being and 
life, presents a particular problem concerning representation and language. Of course, the 
second of the ten commandments, given in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5, forms the basis 
of the care which must be taken in referring to God because the spectre of idolatry is always 
apparent. Nevertheless, our speech about God is always regarded as the address of a 
creature to the transcendent source of all things who exists in unapproachable light. How 
can words refer adequately to God? The response of Rabbi Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) 
was that words cannot refer to God, and that we are therefore only capable of saying what 
God is not. To say that ‘God is good’ is not to have any handle on God’s goodness; it is 
merely to say, falteringly, that God is not evil. This became known as the via negativa, or 
‘negative way’. Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274), writing in response to Maimonides, insisted 
that, although we name God from creatures, we do so neither univocally nor equivocally, 
but analogically. He resisted Maimonides’s purely negative approach to theological 
language and argued that, when we make statements such as ‘God is good’, we do not 
merely state that ‘God is not evil’. Rather, we name God as good in himself without thereby 
claiming that we have a grasp on what it is for God to be good. Why? Because what it is for 
God to be good is not what it is for a human being to be good (just as what it is for a dog to 
be faithful is not what it is for a husband to be faithful), although a human being is good by 
virtue of his or her participation in divine goodness. To comprehend divine goodness we 
would need to know what kind of thing God is, and both Aquinas and Maimonides would 
insist that we do not know God in himself; we only know God through his creation and, for 
Aquinas, we name him by analogy.8 
 
Against this background, Aquinas, along with much of the Christian and Jewish 
Neoplatonic tradition, maintained that God is most supremely intelligible in himself because 
God is fully actual.9 There is, as it were, no ambiguity in God. As being-itself, God is the 
source of all created being. However, to us God is wholly other and transcendent. Our 
intellects are suited to the knowledge of creatures. We know God by means of his creation 
and revelation in accordance with the capacities of the human intellect and the constantly 
                                           
8 For a much fuller explanation of the analogical naming of God in Aquinas, see my introduction to Simon 
Oliver and John Milbank (eds), The Radical Orthodoxy Reader (London: Routledge, 2009). See also Rudi te 
Velde, Aquinas on God: the Divine Science of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), ch.4.  
9 See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a.12.7. 
arriving gifts of divine grace. On Aquinas’s view, contrary to much modern philosophy, the 
human intellect is not the measure of intelligibility. The fact that we can grasp aspects of 
the created world but not God does not, for Aquinas, mean that the created world is more 
intelligible in itself. It may be more intelligible for us; in itself, however, the created world, 
in being contingent and subject to change, has its measure of intelligibility by virtue of its 
participation in the eternal and unchanging Good which is God. 
 
For a particular tradition, both Jewish and Christian, which finds its deep roots in Platonic 
metaphysics, the linguistic and artistic representation of the divine always faces the spectre 
of idolatry. Nevertheless, those representations are understood as consummated and yet 
fully exceeded in the worship of a wholly transcendent divinity.10 Liturgical mediations of 
the divine are made possible by theosis. However, in the context of this same tradition’s view 
that evil is a privation of that supremely intelligible Good, does not the problem of 
linguistic representation and intelligibility of evil present itself for precisely the opposite 
reason? If the Good is, in itself, supremely intelligible, and all creaturely references to the 
transcendent participate by theosis in that surfeit of intelligibility and meaning, what are we 
to say about representations of evil which is precisely a privation of that intelligibility and 
meaning? Does evil become unrepresentable? Can any intelligible discourse be maintained? 
 
One answer to this question is, no, evil is unintelligible and not representable. However, this 
is not quite the response of the tradition which maintains that evil is privatio boni. It is 
crucial to remember that evil’s absence of meaning is only revealed with reference to the 
always prior intelligibility of the Good. It is not evil which reveals its own unintelligibility, 
for this would grant to evil the autonomy of self-determination. Rather, it is the Good which 
reveals evil’s unintelligibility. At all times, evil is parasitic on the Good. We do not know 
evil as unintelligible simply in itself. We only know evil as an unintelligible absence of 
meaning with reference to the infinite abundance of intelligibility and meaning that we find 
in the Good. Moreover, the tradition of privatio boni continually insists that an absolute evil 
is not possible, for it would dissolve into nothingness.11 So even an evil as ‘radical’ as the 
Shoah is in some sense parasitic on a prior good, although in itself it remains blind to its 
privative nature. For example, Hannah Arendt’s report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 
1961 and 1962 comments that even the Nazi commanders were parasitic on a notion of the 
                                           
10 See Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997). 
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a.48.4. 
good in the sense that, in however deranged, depraved and murderous a fashion, they 
thought they were doing the right thing.12 
 
While maintaining that evil is not utterly unintelligible and unrepresentable – in other 
words, that it can still, in some sense, be spoken – the tradition of privatio boni suggests that 
evil is only interpretable in relation to a primeval Good, as the lack of that Good. In this 
sense, we cannot account for evil with reference to a purpose for it is that which, by its very 
nature, lacks purpose. As Aquinas would put it, evil has no formal or final cause.13 While we 
might be able to outline the intellectual and historical background to the Shoah (long-
simmering European anti-Semitism, the legacy of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
German philosophy, the humiliation of Germany after the First World War, and so on), we 
cannot, as the enterprise of theodicy so often attempts to do, provide a justification for the 
Shoah. An example of this kind of justification can be found in the theodicy of the British 
philosopher Richard Swinburne for whom certain ‘higher-order goods’ such as extreme 
bravery or generosity (of the kind shown by Oskar Schindler) depend on certain kinds of 
suffering for their execution and manifestation.14  However, Swinburne’s theodicy is the 
precise inverse of the privatio boni tradition for it renders the practice of good acts parasitic 
upon the prior occurrence of certain kinds of evil and suffering. Instead, for the tradition 
which understands evil as a privation, such evil can have no intelligible justification; if we 
were able to give a reason (in the sense of purpose) for the murder of millions of Jews, or 
cancer in a single child, we would live in a Satanic world. This is not to say that such 
suffering is irredeemable or utterly unspeakable. It is to say that suffering calls not for a 
justification which attempts to render suffering intelligible, but for a response borne of the 
absolute priority of the Good. 
 
We have seen that God, as the transcendent source of created being, is spoken of 
analogically using words which, from our point of view, also name creatures. It is perfection 
terms – good, true, wise – which, for Aquinas, are predicated primarily of God and 
secondarily of creatures. So in a sense our speech about God will also be speech about other 
things in their created relation to God. That speech ‘borrows’ its intelligibility from the 
                                           
12 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin, 1994). 
13 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a.49.1. 
14 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch.11. The most 
effective articulation of the view that evil is a privation of the good with reference to a recent horrific disaster 
can be found in David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005). 
divine, for God is the ultimate focus of reference.15 Insofar as we speak of the good of 
creation, we speak intelligibly of its orientation to the Good. Speech about evil will be 
compromised by the dissolution of meaning and intelligibility. Nevertheless, for the privatio 
boni tradition that unintelligibility will not be revealed unless such speech is placed by the 
priority of the Good and its surfeit of meaning. If evil is understood as authenticating its 
own unintelligibility and non-representability, it is rendered in some sense absolute and 
ineffable, becoming in Manichean fashion the mirror image of the Good. It is only the 
transcendent Good, which Jewish and Christian thought name as ‘God’, that is ineffable. 
Evil is the dissolution of meaning, that dissolution being named by the Good. 
 
It is against this background of the ontological and hermeneutical priority of the Good that 
I wish to read the approach to the evil of the Shoah in Schindler’s List and Life is Beautiful. 
 
Reading Schindler’s List and Life is Beautiful 
 
In approaching the subject of the Shoah, Spielberg is responding to the widespread concern 
that awareness and knowledge of Nazi atrocities perpetrated against Jews and other groups 
in the mid-twentieth century is waning, particularly in his native north America. 
Nevertheless, he resisted making an ‘American’ film. The actors are European and the 
locations authentic. The attention to historical detail and fidelity to the visual archives (for 
example in Ralph Fiennes’s depiction of the camp commander Amon Goeth) has been 
apparent to many commentators and critics. Of course, one important strategy for 
rendering Schindler’s List an authentic mediation of events in the 1940s is the decision to 
film almost exclusively in black and white. Coupled with the extensive use of hand-held 
cameras, this enables the film to allude simultaneously to a number of different filmic genres: 
war-time newsreel, 1930s and 40s cinema, cinema vérité and contemporary documentary. 
The use of light, smoke and close-up portrait shots is particularly reminiscent of mid-
twentieth century cinema, particularly film noir. More specifically, the frequent use of 
chiaroscuro lighting (a common technique before colour could mediate relationships and 
meaning) heightens the ambiguity in Schindler’s character, and the symbiotic relationship 
between Schindler (Liam Neeson) and Goeth. These factors, which feature heavy layers of 
                                           
15 Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s pros hen (towards a single focus) view of analogy as attribution rather than 
proportion. We call a diet and a medical treatment ‘healthy’ by virtue of their common focus in the health of the 
human body. The body is healthy in itself; health is attributed to the diet and the medicine by virtue of their 
relationship to the body. Likewise, God is good in himself. A human being has goodness attributed to him or her 
by virtue of a relationship with the divine source of goodness. 
cinematic nostalgia, combine to create the impression of reality and authenticity: we are 
really ‘seeing’ the Shoah’s principal characters, from the victims to the heroes and the 
psychotic perpetrators. 
 
Given the aim of presenting the Shoah to a wide audience, it is not surprising that Spielberg 
has been thought to adopt what is often called a classical narrative approach. 16  This 
approach to cinema, which dominated Hollywood at least until the 1960s, relies on well 
delineated character plots in which motivations are clear and the narrative develops in a 
linear fashion. Audiences are encouraged to associate particularly with a single, central 
character (the ‘star’ of the movie) whose goals define the seamless development of a unique 
narrative. In the case of Schindler’s List, the goals of the central character, Oskar Schindler, 
are initially those of profit-making from his enamelware factory and only later become the 
rescue of Jews who are to be deported to concentration camps. The need to provide a reason 
why Schindler would risk his profit and life to act heroically in this way is a particular 
challenge for the film; to maintain the classical narrative style, the viewer must understand 
the central character’s key psychological motivations which govern the plot. The key point 
concerning the classical approach to cinema is that the viewer is enabled to ‘lose herself’ in 
the visual experience. The film becomes almost transparent as the work of interpretation is 
undertaken effortlessly by a complex set of filming techniques in which ambiguities are 
made plain and then resolved quickly and neatly. For example, the character of Schindler is, 
initially, mysterious. During the opening sequences of the film, as he dresses to attend a 
party, we see only his hands. The lighting of Schindler’s face again stresses both light and 
dark. As the story unfolds and Schindler develops from profiteer to saviour, these 
ambiguities are neatly resolved to reveal the hero. The worrying aspect of this narrative is 
that, faced with a choice between the hero Schindler and the psychotic Goeth, audiences 
departed from cinemas reassured that, if they had been present in Poland or Germany in the 
1940s, they, of course, would have acted as Schindler. 
 
As Miriam Bratu Hansen observes, this classical approach eradicates the complexities of the 
real world because ‘it relies on neoclassicist principles of compositional unity, motivation, 
linearity, equilibrium, and closure – principles singularly inadequate in the face of an event 
                                           
16 David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and 
Mode of Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘Schindler’s 
List is Not Shoah: Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory’ in Spielberg’s Holocaust: 
Critical Perspectives on Schindler’s List, ed. Yosefa Loshitzky (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), pp.81ff. 
that by its very nature defies our narrative urge to make sense of, to impose order on the 
discontinuity and otherness of historical experience.’ 17  While Goeth’s motivations are 
interpreted in terms of murderous psychosis and depictions of the brutal murder of Jews 
scattered through the film add to a sense of the sheer senseless nihilism of these events, 
nevertheless this narrative as a whole is rendered intelligible and therefore comprehensible 
through the classical genre. Causal motivations – even those of Goeth and other soldiers – 
are rendered clear because, we are told, they see Jews as animals, not humans. The narrative 
of the Shoah is represented within a genre which governs much of classical film-making in 
the mid-twentieth century and allows audiences to believe that they have ‘seen’ or 
‘experienced’ the Holocaust in all its authenticity. 
 
A number of commentators have argued that, in other respects, Schindler’s List subsumes 
within itself other depictions of the Shoah and thereby develops its credentials as the 
definitive and intelligible representation. Allusions to previous Holocaust films, notable 
Night and Fog and Shoah, abound. For example, the huge piles of suitcases, glasses, shoes 
and other possessions once belonging to deported Jews was famously depicted in Night and 
Fog and is repeated in Schindler’s List. Nevertheless, as Joshua Hirsch points out, the role 
that such images play in Spielberg’s film is quite different.18 For Renais in Night and Fog, 
the piles of possessions indicate the unimaginable and unrepresentable extent of the loss 
which constituted the Shoah. Such evil is unintelligible in its depth, extent and deprivation. 
Similarly, the throat-cutting gesture made by a bystander as a train-load of Jews makes its 
way to Auschwitz is used by Lanzmann in Shoah to depict the moral complicity of the 
bystander. Spielberg uses both in Schindler’s List, but not to indicate the unintelligible and 
the privative; rather, these are events of history which are, as Hirsch states, quite 
representable. 
 
While Schindler’s List is unambiguously a ‘Holocaust film’ with a single, linear narrative, the 
same cannot be said for Life is Beautiful. Beginning in Italy in 1939, the film begins by 
stating very clearly that it is a fable. Crucially, we are told that the story is difficult to tell. 
There is no pretence to speak literally or historically, and one might say that the film is only 
tangentially about the Shoah. The Shoah is placed, rather than places, other more 
fundamental narratives. The film is saturated in comedy, allegory, layered narratives and 
                                           
17 Miriam Bratu Hansen, op.cit., p.81. 
18 Joshua Hirsch, After Image: Film, Trauma, and the Holocaust (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), 
p.147. 
magic. Divided into two parts, the first half of Life is Beautiful focuses on the growing and 
magical romance between Guido Orefice (Robert Benigni) and Dora (Nicoletta Braschi). As 
their romance unfolds, so the spectre of fascist anti-Semitism gradually emerges as an aspect 
of the film. However, at no point is that anti-Semitism allowed to stand alone as if it might 
interpret itself; it is interpreted as ludicrous by the admittedly daring use of comedy. For 
example, when a government inspector comes to visit Dora’s school, Guido takes his place 
and, via slapstick and farce, provides a devastating critique of Italy’s anti-Semitic laws of the 
late 1930s in a fashion that renders those policies quite literally laughable.19 
 
The magical narratives which Guido weaves into everyday events as he seeks the love of 
Dora point to the multiple meanings of life beyond its purely material significance; there is 
always more to be seen.20 These hidden meanings are explored with particular poignancy in 
Guido’s relationship with Lessing, a German doctor staying at the hotel where Guido works 
as a waiter. Other than Guido, Dora and their son Giosuè, Lessing is the only character to 
appear in both halves of the film.21 Strangely, he is fixated on riddles which he cannot solve. 
In one scene in the first half of the film, Guido solves a riddle which had been perplexing 
Lessing for eight days: ‘The bigger is it, the less you see it.’ The answer: obscurity. In the 
second half of the film, when Guido and Giosuè are together in the labour camp (while Dora, 
a Gentile who has voluntarily followed her husband and son, is in the women’s section), 
Guido once again encounters his friend Lessing who is now working as a doctor in the camp. 
While Guido is waiting on the tables of the Germans in the camp mess, Lessing states that 
he must talk with Guido urgently. Needless to say, Guido is full of expectation; he believes 
that his friend, the doctor, will aid his family’s escape. The expectation is allowed to mount 
through a number of vaguely comic but tense scenes. Finally, the meeting takes place in a 
corner of the dining room. Lessing has a ludicrous riddle he cannot solve: ‘Fat, fat, ugly, 
ugly, all yellow in reality. If you ask me what I am I answer “Cheep, cheep, cheep.” Walking 
along I go, “Poopoo.”’ Throughout the scene, Guido is silent. As Benigni portrays Guido’s 
reaction, his comic persona appears wholly crushed. His face conveys utter incomprehension 
                                           
19 It is important to note that this scene, one of the funniest in the film, critiques an Italian government policy 
rather than brutal murder. At no point in the film is murder and genocide – to which only allusion is made – the 
subject of specifically comic derision. 
20 For an excellent and more detailed reading of these narratives, see Maurizio Viano, ‘Life is Beautiful: 
Reception, Allegory, and Holocaust Laughter,’ Jewish Social Studies 5.3 (1999): 47-66. A detailed analysis of 
Life is Beautiful is also available in Carlo Celli, The Divine Comic: The Cinema of Roberto Benigni (London: 
Scarcrow Press, 2001), ch.11. 
21 It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the significance of the names of certain characters in Life is 
Beautiful, but the importance of references to the  German philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and 
Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781) should be noted. 
and the total unintelligibility of his circumstances. Guido departs the shot leaving Lessing 
banging his fist on the sideboard in deranged frustration. This exchange, one of the very 
few which mirrors the first half of the film, becomes a metaphor for the unintelligible and 
nihilistic nature of the Shoah. Unlike the representation of Schindler’s List and its voyeuristic 
approach to brutal murder, this reference is wholly tangential and ‘unreal’, yet it 
nevertheless does not leave Nazi psychosis uninterpreted; Guido, the master of narrative 
and the discloser of secret meanings, is crushed. Still, he returns to his son who, despite the 
hidden murder of his father later in the film, will eventually emerge alive from the labour 
camp to tell a more primitive story. 
 
A key aspect of the second part of Life is Beautiful, in which Guido is interred in a labour 
camp with Giosuè, is ‘the game’. In one of the most comic scenes in the film, Guido pretends 
to translate the yelled instructions of the German guard concerning life in the camp from 
German into Italian. Guido, to the astonishment of his fellow inmates and Giosuè, tells of a 
game in which prisoners compete to win a tank. By means of this game, Guido attempts to 
lift the spirits of his son and preserve his innocence. While commentators have observed 
that Giosuè is more aware of his circumstances than Guido allows, there remain competing 
narratives at work in this part of the film. Which will win? As sober and realistic observers, 
we know that Guido’s account of ‘the game’ is pure fantasy and that tragedy is near. Indeed, 
for Guido, this is what comes to pass; he is shot dead, unseen, as Giosuè hides from the 
fleeing German soldiers. Yet as Giosuè emerges from his hiding place into a new day amidst 
the abandoned camp, an American tank with liberating soldiers enters through the gates. 
Giosuè climbs aboard and enjoys his ‘victor’s ride’. We are left with the question, which 
narrative was more fundamental for Giosuè? It is this final scene of apparently joyful and 
wholly sentimental survival with former prisoners running into sunlit countryside which 
has incurred the scorn of many critics of Life is Beautiful. Yet it is in no sense realistic. This 
is a commentarial metaphor. The competing narratives of the film unfold in a fashion totally 
unlike the single linear narrative of Schindler’s List. For Life is Beautiful, despite the 
devastating incoherence and unintelligibility of the camp (again, a metaphor for the Shoah) a 
narrator in the form of Giosuè lives to tell a more fundamental story which nevertheless 
places the Shoah and marks is privative unintelligibility. Can the Shoah be represented? Yes, 
but only as the privation of a more ontologically fundamental Good. In this sense, it is not 
‘ineffable’. As the film closes, we finally learn that the narrator at the beginning of the film, 
who announced the fable as ‘a simple story, but not an easy one to tell’, is Giosuè with 
whom the film closes. 
 The allegorical significance of Life is Beautiful was ignored by many critics who derided its 
historical inaccuracies and revisionist tendencies. This is to misunderstand Benigni’s 
purpose which is to convey both the Shoah’s privative unintelligibility and its place within a 
more fundamental narrative that refers to a transcendent Good. He does this by means of 
metaphor and allegory. Can we nevertheless regard the fantastic stories of Life is Beautiful, 
such as ‘the game’ in the labour camp, as childish and sentimental escape from the brutal 
reality of the Shoah which simply repeats the violence of the camps? Not if a proper 
understanding of allegory is maintained. Allegory does not displace other readings of texts; 
it supplements them and points to unforeseen realities and symbolism. The allegories of Life 
in Beautiful do not displace the material reality of everyday life, whether of mundane events 
or the horrors of a concentration camp. Rather, they point to other possibilities, wider 
frames of reference and more primitive meanings. This is not to suggest that the Shoah has 
a hidden meaning; quite the contrary, for Begnini is careful to highlight the unintelligibility 
of the camp – if you like, its ‘untranslatable’ nature. Rather, it places the Shoah within the 
wider context of other and wider narratives which are more primitive, and thus resists the 
tendency to make absolute and ineffable the tragic, horrific and unimaginable story of mid-
twentieth century European Jewry. 
 
I began this essay with reference to the tangential nature of language about divinity. To 
speak of God is to speak analogically with reference to creatures. In being created, those 
creatures are symbols of the creator. It is as created that they gain their meaning. For the 
tradition which understands evil to be the privation of the Good which is God, evil dissolves 
meaning and intelligibility. Yet that dissolution is only made apparent by reference to the 
more fundamental and ‘real’ story of transcendent goodness. Because of Schindler’s List’s 
self-enclosed and all-encompassing realism, it does little to reveal the incoherence and 
nihilism of the Shoah beyond the literal portrayal of brutal murder which it renders visible 
in unproblematic fashion. The problem with such depictions of brutality is that, in their 
simple literality, audiences become over-familiar with such scenes. At some point, it 
becomes apparent that one must leave the theatre; one is watching a film. For Life is 
Beautiful, the narrative extends beyond the movie theatre’s doors. If spirituality is the 
faithful search for as yet undisclosed or unrealised meanings, Life is Beautiful is of greater 
theological import than its realist counterpart Schindler’s List. 
